

Nelustadt: (Skybolt Study, 1963)

Problem (for future): find rules, questions, changes, that in future situations "like this one," would bring more improvement than harm.

→ Failure ~~was~~ to treat ~~some~~ Allied response with the same "respect" we are supposed to show to the enemy in our plans. Failure to take "enemy response" (plans, goals, perspectives, constraints, conflicts, expectations, political problems, uncertainties) into account: "meaning" of our action to him; possible conflicts of interest.

Our plans were only "what we would do to (for) Ally": not what Ally might do to (demand of) or for us.

We were creating a problem for Ally (as, for enemy); yet taking little effort to learn or influence his choice of "solution." (We were content to wait to find out his plans, then react to them).

Like, making a left turn from right-hand lane, signalling, but not looking back: taking no account of other driver's momentum, lack of attention (distracted by other problems), prior expectations (created by us) ?

We assume he'll "solve his problem" in a way that won't create problem for us (he has interest in avoiding crash)

Don't figure with his emotions or strength of his drives (he might just blast on down that will scare us out of control, or try to pass us, or speed up to make his change, meanwhile blasting or counting on our looking).

But note nature of incentives not to "look ahead" to UK responses to our offers (believed "unacceptable"); Chiefs had "acceptable" offer, "up their sleeves," but were afraid to expose it to their Indians, who would disapprove. [This can't always be avoided; but some Indians should have analyzed problems; if only to predict Chiefs' reactions under pressure, + nature of pressure, ways to avert]. Results: it wasn't acceptable (lack of feedback); Chiefs had to improvise, went further than necessary. (No feedback because they thought they knew when they would come out; + negotiation had to be in person — Rubel couldn't do it — because of divergence from staff. Offer unacceptable partly because of misconception that might have been cleared up by staff (No apparent warning by Chiefs that NATO commitment would be unacceptable).)

State effort didn't influence Bush or McN; but did influence Bowen(?) so McN cut him out; and led McN to lead off memo... which informed T.

Chiefs didn't attempt any substitute for the impact of their staffs: info, criticism; nor did they allow time to correct error.

By everyone: Silence (lack of response) interpreted as: ^{assent, "calm,"} helpful planning activity
[not: indication of problem]

Big shock was finding "are up sleeve" unacceptable on Dec 11; not corrected Dec. 16 meeting (delusion by others than McN? McN didn't convey?)

(Did T point really fail to get through to McN?)

~~The~~ Even BNA merely ~~then~~ predicted that UK would face a big problem: not, what they might do about it).

Bowie didn't anticipate that VFR would be subjected to UK sound & fury... Indians didn't foresee effect of UK moves on Chiefs.

Chiefs foresaw UK rejection of Indians offers: but didn't explore their favored response.
COST OF AVOIDING "PREMATURE CONTROVERSY" (Can it be reduced)

Chiefs all foresaw Pol. so outcome - yet ~~has~~ deal had to be improvised at Nassau. e.g. by turning to ad hoc critics? but they don't know context.

Chiefs wanted to "be generous" (unlike Indians): but form & timing of offer meant Mac got no credit for it, suffered defeat. Chiefs asked, How can we help them (how urging), not, ^{How do we get at} of the underlying?

How could UK hurt us? We (Chiefs, JFK) could look inept, insensitive, callous, clumsy, "unpolitical," treacherous, manipulative: support Exonerated claims; bad ally. Style ^{more trouble for Mac hants JFK:} if avoidable.

Here, in judging political competence of Administration, "regret" counts: what could have been achieved, or avoided; not just: How is result? or How good relative to the worst that could have happened, or, was proposed, or to what would have happened with no intervention?

Compare to Cuba.

Admin. wants to demonstrate that better outcomes were infeasible, or impossible to foresee, or intolerably risky, or had hidden costs.

Above all, fear impression that by "doing it a bit better" — style, grace, competence — things could have turned out much better.

(Was this, the cost of Skybolt?)

Need for SecDef memo on "short-run budget items + operational plans." SecDef should see alternatives for plans